Mahendra Lal Das v. State of Bihar and Ors.

SETID, J. Leave granted. The appellant who, at the relevant time, was an Executive Engine'er, Public Engineering Department, Mechanical Division, Ranchi, has prayed for quashing of the FIR registered on 20.5.1988 again&t him under Sections 5(2)­ read with Section 5(l)(e) of the Prevention of Ccrruption Act, 1947 wherein it was alleged that the appellant was in possession of disproportionate assets to the extent of Rs. 50,600. The FIR was sought to be quashed mainly on the ground that despite expiry of over 12 years, the respondent-State had not granted the sanction which amounted to the violation of his right of life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The petition, filed by the appellant, was dismissed vide the order impugned on the ground that mere delay in granting the sanction has not prejudiced the appellant in any manner particularly when he is already on anticipatory bail. It appears that one Smt. Usha Punindre Narayan Sinha, filed a FIR in the Vigilance Thana, Division and District, Patna, alleging that the appellant while holding different posts during the years 1961-62 to 1982-83 acquired dispro­ portionate assets by misusing his official position and adopting corrupt means. During investigation, the appellant gave details of his income and expenses, on the basis of which the IO concluded that the appellant was in possession of Rs. 50,600 as· unaccountable money. As no prosecution was launched against the appellant till the year 2000, he moved the High Court for quashing the proceed­ ings and his prayer was rejected vide the order impugned. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent-State it is 160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 4 S.C.R A submitted that a case of disproportionate assets of Rs. 50,600 was registered against the appellant as P.S. No. 0017 /88 under the provisions of Prevention , of Corruption Act and detailed enquiry held by the then Deputy Superintendent of Police. After four years of investigation, the IO submitted a proposal for granting sanction for prosecution of the appellant for which a letter was sent B to the Secretary, PH Engineering Depru.1ment, Patna through the Vigilance Department on 6.1.1992. The Department of PHED as well as the Law Depart­ ment, after the scrutiny of the allegations made against the appellant, arrived at the conclusion that the case could not be proved in the court. They further concluded that the grant of sanction would prove to be a futile attempt on the part of the Department, The Advocate General of the State also opined that no case for sanction was made out on the basis of the material collected during the investigation of the case registered against the appellant. The file was also sent to the Chief Minister through Chief Secretary. The Chief Secretary sug­ gested that the attention of the investigating agency be drawn to the defects and after obtaining its opinion appropriate orders be passed. Again in the year 1992, the then Investigating Officer submitted a proposal for granting sanction for prosecution of the appellant put till the time the petition was disposed of by the High Court, no orders were passed on the proposal seeking the grant of sanction. Even in the affidavit filed in this Court on 27.'11.2000, it is submitted ·· that "A fresh letter for sanction of prosecution against accused Mahendra Lal E Das was sent by Vigilance Department to Dy. Secretary, PHED vide letter No. SRO 17 /88 Vig. 794 C.~. dated 17.11.2000. Now the matter is under consi~­ eration and opinion by the parent department". However, during the arguments we were informed that ultimately sanction has been granted after filing of the SLP in this Court. It is true that interference by the court at the investigation stage is not called for. However, it is equally true that the investigating agency cannot be given the latitude of protracting the conclusion of the investigation without any limit of time. This Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak &Am:, f 1992] I SCC 225 while interpreting the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution G held that every citizen has a right of speedy trial of the case pending against him. The speedy trial ~as considered alsc in public interest as it serves the social interest also. It is in the interest of all concerned that guilty or innocence of the. accused is determined as qu_ickly as possible in the circumstances. The right to speedy trial encompasses all the stages, namely, stage of investigation, H enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. While determining the alleged delay, MAHENDRA LAL DAS v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 161 the c0urt has to decide each case on-'its facts having regard: to all atteni;lin~ circumstances including nature of offence, number o( accus~a and 1witnesses, the work-load of the court concerhed, prevailing Ideal cond.itions', etc. Every delay may not be taken as causing prejudice to the accused but the alleged delay has to be considered ii! the totality of the circumstane<es and the.general conspectus of the C(lse_: foprdinate long delay can be taken as a presentive _proo_f of prejudice. In this.case the prosecution has miserably failed to explain the delay of more than 13 years by now, in granting the sanction for prosecution of the appellant-accused of possessing disproportionate wealth of about Rs. 50,600. ' :.. ~ The authorities of the respondent-State also appear to be not satisfied about the C merits of the case and were convinced that despite granting of sanction the trial would be a mere formality and exercise in futility. In cases of corruption the aniount involved is not material but speedy justice is the mandate of the Constitution being in the interests of the accused as well as that of the society. Cases relating to corruption are to be dealt with . swiftly, promptly and without delay. As and when delay is found to have been caused during the investigation, inquiry or trial, the concerned appropriate authorities are under an obligation to find out and deal with the persons responsible for such delay. The delay can be attributed either to the connivance of the authorities with the accused or used as a lever to pressurise and harass the accused as is alleged to have been done to the appellant in this case. The appellant has submitted that due to registration of the case and pendency of the investigation he lost his chance of promotion to the post of Chief Engineer. It is common knowledge that promotions are withheld when pro­ ceedings with respect to allegations of corruption are pending against the incumbent. The appellant has further alleged that he has been deprived the love, affection and the society of his children who were residing in foreign country as on account of the pendency of the investigation he could not afford to leave the country. This Court in Ramanand Chaudhary v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR (1994) SC 948 quashed the investigation against the accused on account of not granting the sanction for more than 13 years. The facts of the present case are almost identical. No useful purpose would be served to put the appellant at trial at this belated stage. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are . l62 .. : SUPREME'COURT REPORfs•· · [200l]'SUPP:'4S.C:R. A\ incliited to'quasti~the .proceedings -againsMhe appelliffinls<permittiitg flirther prosccution·would be·the.travesty. ofjustice and"a mere ritual or formality so· fat as the prosecution·agen'Cy 'is concerned; 'and: unnecessary. burden as·regards' the·oou.rts. This appeal is· accordingly allowed by setting aside the order impugned It~ and'quashing the proceedings initiated against the appeallaitt orHhe basis.of ·PS:Nol•0017/88 .. under the provisions>of Prevention.of Corruption ·Act. K;K:t.:· Appeal'. allowed. . \