T.N. Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka
Cited by 1 judgment in this corpus
- MOHD. ANWAR v. THE STATE (N.C.T. OF DELHI) · 2020 INSC 496
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
The Judgment of the. Court was delivered by
SETHI, J. Claiming insanity at the time of commission of offence of
murdering his own wife Gayathramma and teen aged son Bhaskar, the appel-
E lant has prayed for setting aside the judgment of the trial court as well as the
High Court by which he has been convicted under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. Without leading evidence in
support of his claim, the appellant urged that there was sufficient material on
record which probabilised the existence of circumstances justifying the benefit
F of the exception as incorporated under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code.
It is also submitted that the prosecution had failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In order to appreciate the submissions of the appellant, it is relevant to
take note of the prosecution case as alleged and proved against him vide the
judgment impunged in this appeaL The appellant was a Government servant
employed in the Department of Agriculture from the year 1991. He was
residing with his wife and son in one of the quarters allotted to him by the
Department. The appellant's deceased son was a student of 7th standard at the
time of occurrence. On 12.1.1991, the appellant applied to avail casual leave
on 14.1.1991. The accused, along with his wife and son, had left his house on
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T.N. LAKSHMAIAH v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 203
11.1.1991 and gone to Thadagavadi. On 16.1.1991, he took his wife and son
along with him on the pretext of showing them Shivanasamudra, a picnic spot.
where the River Kaveri makes a fall. He purchased half kilogram of apples
from Devegowda (PWll) in a village shop at Malavalli. At about 9 O'clock
in the morning, the appellant with his wife and son got down from the bus at
Satyagola Hand Post where they purchased and consumed tender coconut. All
the three thereafter walked on foot towards Shivanasamudra. The accused took
his wife and son to the extreme end to show them Gagana Chukki Falls. He
led them downwards telling that he would show the beauty of the falls from
a very near point. He is alleged to have pushed down Bhaskar from that place
who fell on a rock which was 150 feet below. He thereafter caught hold of his
wife and forcibly tied her hands with a red waste thread and dgragged her to
a rock, notwithstanding her pleadings and protests. He tied her saree arount the
neck of his wife and killed her by tightening the knot. Despite being a picnic
spot, he had chosen the spot for commission for the offence where no tourist
normally went. He left the place of occurrence at 4.30 in the evening, got a bus
and went towards Malavalli. He was seen reaching his horn at about 7.30 p.m.
by Sri Kalaiah (PW8). On the next day, the appellat left his house and went
to Kollegal Rural Police Station in the afternoon where he gave a statement
confessing his crime. On the basis of his statement, a case was registered for
offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. As per his disclosure, made in the
statement, the dead body of the wife was recovered from the place pointed out
by him. The body of the son was seen lying on the rock/gorge where the police
could not reach on the first day. When, on the next day, the body of the child
was recorded, he was alive and brought to the Kollegal Hospital and thereafter
sent for better treatment in NIMHANS at Bangalore, where he breathed his
last on 19.1.1999.
On completion of the investigation, the final report was produced, the
case committed to the Sessions and charges framed against the appellant. To
prove their case, the prosecution examined 30 witnesses. It is conceded that
there was no eye-witness to the occurrence. In his statement, recorded under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant accepted that he
was residing with his wife and son in the quarters belonging to the Agriculture G
Department. He also admitted the fact of having applied for casual leave. He
admitted to have left his house on the evening on 11.1.1991 with his wife and
son. He denied the charge of having taken his wife and son to Gagana Chukki
Falls and instead stated that he had gone to Talagawadi with his family. He
stated that he only remembered that his wife had nagged him to eat the meals H
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on 13.1.1991 but does not remember anything thereafter. He claims to have
seen himself in the prison in June, 1991 and stated that he did not remember
as to what ~ad happene4.\in the
1
intervening period.
To ascertain as to whether the accused had committed the crime or not,
the trial court formulated eight points for its determination and after appreci
ating the evidence, hearing the arguments and taking note of the attending
circumstances, concluded that the appellant was guilty for the commission of
the crime of murders of his wife and son. The appeal filed by him was
dismissed by the High Court vide the order impugned in this appeal.
Mr.S. Muralidhar, Amicus curiae who appeared for the appellant submit
ted that the conduct of the accused at or about the time of occurrence, his
having remained a patient of mental illness and the record produced during the
trial probabilised his being insane within the meaning of Section 84 of the
Indian Penal Code which entitled him acquittal. He has further contended that
as the case of the prosecution rests only on the circumstantial evidence, the
prosecution has failed to connect the accused with the commission of the crime
as, according to the learned counsel, the chain of circumstances is not so
complete to draw the only inference of the accused being guilty of the offence
charged .
To allay all apprehensions, this Court vide order dated 15.11.1999 di
rected the Superintendent of the Central Jail, New Central Prison, Bangalore
to forward the medical report, if any, concerning him for facilitating the court
to ascertain his mental condition. In response, the Senior Superintendent of
Central Prison, Bangalore has submitted the medical report dated 6.12.1999.
issued by the psychiatrist of the prison Hospital. In the report it is stated thae .
the appellant was examined and diagnosed as suffering from "moderate depres
sion". He was put on treatment and had shown improvement. At the time of
submission of the report his mental condition was stated to be &atisfactory.
Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code provides that. nothing is an offence
which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsound
ness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that what he is
doing is either wrong or contrary to law. The section forms part of Chapter IV
dealing with general exceptions. The importance of the chapter was highlighted
by Lord Macaulay before the House of Commons at the time of introduction
of the Bill as under :
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T.N. LAKSHMAIAH v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 205
"This chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of
repeating in every penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
Some limitations relate only to a single provision, or to a very small
class of provisions... Every such exception evid~ntly ought to be
appended to the rule which it is intended to modify. But there are other
exceptions which are common to all the penal clauses of the Code, or
to a greater variety of clauses dispersed over many chapters. It would
obviously be inconvenient to repeat these exceptions several times in
every page. We have, therefore, placed them in a separate chapter and,
we have provided that every definition of an offence, every penal
provision, and every illustration of a definition or penal provision,
shall be construed subject to the provisions contained in that chapter".
The principle embodied in the chapter is based upon the maxim "actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea'', i.e., an act is not criminal unless there is
criminal intent.
I
!
I
Under the Evidence Act, the onus of proving any of the exception
mentioned in. the Chapter lies on the accused though the requisite standard of
proof is not the same as expected from the prosecution. It is sufficient if an
accused is able to bring his case within the ambit of any of the general
exceptions by the standard of preponderance of probabilities, as a result of E
which he may succeed not because that he proves his case to the hilt but
because of the version given by him casts a doubt on the prosecution case.
In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ahmadulla, AIR (1961) SC 998 this Court
held that the burden of proof that the mental condition of the accused was, at
the crucial point of time, such as is described by the Section, lies on the accused
who claims the benefit of this exemption vide Section 105 of the Evidence Act
(Illustration a). The settled position of law is that every man is presumed to be
sane and to posses1: a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts
unless the cbntrary is proved. Mere ipsi dixit of the accused is not enough for
availing of the benefit of the exceptions under chapter IV.
In a case where the exception under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code
is claimed, the Court has to consider whether, at the time of commission of the
offence, the accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of
knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or a
A contrary to law. Entire conduct of the accused, from the time of the commission
of the offence upto the time, the Sessions proceedings commenced, is relevant
for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether plea raised was genuine, bonafide
or after-thought. Dealing with the plea of insanity, the scope of Section 84 IPC,
the attending circumstances and the burden ·or proof, this Court in Dahyabhai
:a Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1964) Sc 1563, held.
"It is ftindamental principle of criminal jurisprudence of that an ac
cused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite
intention described in S.299 of the Indian Penal Code. This general
burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But, S.84
of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence if the
accused at the time of doing that act, by reason of unsoundness of mind
was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing
was either wrong or contrary to law. This being an exception, under
S.105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of
circumstances bringing the case within the said exception lies on the
accused, and the court shall presume the absence of such circum
stances. Under S.105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition of
"shall presume" in S.4 thereof, the court shall regard the absence of
such circumstances as proved unless~ after considering the matters
before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their exist
ence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circum
stances of the particular case, to act upon the opposition that they did
exist. To put in other words, the accused will have to rebut the
presumption that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material
before the court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said
circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them.
The accused has to satisfy the standard of a 'prudent man'. If the
material placed before the court, such as oral and documentary evi
dence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence,
satisfies the test of 'prudent man' the accused will have discharged his
burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the
burden under S.105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable
doubt in the mind of a judge as regards one or other of the necessary
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T.N. LAKSHMAIAH v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 207
ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable A ·
doubt in the mind of the judge whether the accused had the requisite
intention laid down in S.299 of the Indian Penal Code. If the judge has
such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit the accused, for in that event
the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the
accused. There is no conflict between the general burden, which is B
always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special
burden that rests on the accused to make out his. defence of insanity."
After referring to various text books and the earlier pronouncements of
this Court, it was further held :
"The doctine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity
may be stated in the following propositions: (1) The prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed that
offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that
always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the
trial. (2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accus~d may not
insane, when' he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by S.84
of the Indian Penal Code; the accused may rebut it by placing before
the court all the relevant evidence - oral, documentary or circumstan
tial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon
a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if the accused was not able to
establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the
offence, the evidence placed before the court by the accused or by the
prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as
regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens
rea of the accused and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit
the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on
the prosecution was not discharged."
To the same effect is the judgment in Bhikari v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR (1966) SC 1.
It is admitted that the appellant in this case, has not led any evidence in
proof of the plea of insanity. There is nothing on the record to infer that the
accused was of unsound mind at or about the time of occurrence. His behaviour
at the time and subsequent to the commission of the crime clearly indicates that
he knew and was capable of knowing the nature of the act done by him. Being
annoyed with the attitude of the deceased, he appears to have taken a conscious
'
decision of taking them away from the house and committed the crime at a
secluded place. He had all faculties to safely reach home and sleep for the night.
At no point of time his behaviour is shown to be abnormal. The plea, though
not strictly but by implication, appears to have been taken by ~he accused for
the first time when his statement was recorded under Section 313 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. We have found no record allegedly showing the appel
lant to be suffering .from any mental disease when he is stated to have applied
for bail. The plea raised, on the face of it, is after-thought and bereft of any
substance. The opinion of the doctor obtained after about 8 years also does not
indicate any history of medical disorder of the appellant. .Even at the time of
examination in the year 1999, he was diagnosed of suffering from "moderate
depression" which is likely to be there in the circumstances where such person
is confined in prison on the charge of the murder of his wife and son. We are
satisfied that the appellant was sane and understood the implications of the act
done by him and in no case was having unsound mind within the meaning of
Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, at the relevant time.
We are also not satisfied with the submission of the learned counsel of.
the appellant that the prosecution had failed to prove the complete chain of
circumstances connecting the accused with the commission of the crime. In its
detailed judgment the trial court has referred to proved circumstances which
lead to the only inference of the involvement of the accused in the commission
of the crime. Similarly, the High Court, in its detailed judgment, has referred
to relevant evidence and the incriminating circumstances. We do not find any
ground to draw any other inference in the present case.
There is no substance in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.
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