Sri Kempaiah v. Lingaiah and Ors.

SETHI, J. The appellant-landlord prayed for eviction of the respond­ ents-tenants on the ground of his bonafide personal requirement within the meaning of Section 21(1)(h) of the Ka1'nataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act''): He submitted th_at he had a large family and was residing in a rented premises. ·He intended to convert the entire premises, in the occupation of the respondents-tenants and some other tenants, into one · po1tion by making suitable alterati.ons. It was further contended that the respondents were in atTears of payment of ren( The Trial Court allowed the petition holding that the appellant required the premises for his bona.fide use and occupation but in revision filed by the respondents-tenants, the order of the Trial Court was set aside vide the common order impugned in tl1ese appeals. The appeUant submits that the High Court was not justified in allowing the revision petitions and setting aside the order passed by the Trial Court al1egedly without looking into the fact that the entire premises in question was to be made as one unit as per plan Exhibit P-8. It is further con.tended that the High Court was not justified in holding that there existed discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses produced by the appel­ lant or that he had no reasonable bonafide requirement of the pr~mises in occupation of tl1e respondent-tenants. The conclusions arrived at by the High Court are te1med to he not based upon the evidence led in the case and the . ( '• .. SRI KEMPAIAH v. LINGAIAH [SETHI, J.] 647 rejection of his prayer for eviction is causing great hardship to him. It is further A submitted that the findings of fact arrived at by the Trial Court could not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 50 of the Act provides: "SO.Revision (1) The High Court may, at any time call for and examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Small Causes or the Court of Civil Judge under this Act or any order pas~ed by the Controllerunder Sections 14, 15, 16 or 17 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. (2) The District Judge may; at any time call for and examine any order passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Munsiff referred to in sub­ clause (iii) or clause ( d) of Section 3 for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding and ·may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. The order D of the District Judge shall be final. (3) The costs of and incidental to all proceedings before the High Court or the District Court shall be in the discretion of the High Court or the District Judge, as the case may be." It has been held in Bhoolchand & Anr. v. Kay Pee Cee Investments & I Anr., [1991] 1 SCC 343 that the revisional powers of the High Court, under the Act, are wider than the powers conferred upon it under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court is not precluded to appreciate the evidence for arriving at the conclusion regarding the alleged reasonable bonafide requirement. We do not find any fault in the judgment of the High Court in so far as the scope of its powers under Section 50 of the Act is concerned. Regarding non payment of rent, the High Court has found that the landlord had not been able to show as to what actual quantmn of amount each G teriant wa:s liable to pay when he issued the notice. Despite showing the total amount allegedly payable by the tenants, the landlord failed to show the rate of rent of the leased premises in occupation of each of the respondents-tenants. The Trial Court, therefore, rightly held that "in the absence of any material regarding the rate of rent, the self-testimony of PW 1 cannot be accepted". It H A may be ~oticed that the appellant himself did not appear as a witness in the case a~d trie1 to ~ro~e the averments m~de in ~e petition by prod~ction of PWl, · his son, !lS his. witness. The aforesaid finding of fact was not disturbed by the High Cowt. Regarding the reasonable bonafide requirement of the appellant, the High Court, on appreciation of evidence, found that he had no bonafide rea­ sonable requirement, the case was not a case in which partial eviction could have been ordered and if the eviction is ordered, greater hardships would be caused. to the tenants who were all proved.to be poor people. Though it was pleaded that the appellant was under compulsion to vacate the premises under his occupation as his l~ndlord was insisting to vacate the same, yet no evidence was led in that behalf. It may have been a wish or desir~, - ' of the appellant to occupy the leased premises but he failed to prove 'the reasonable bonafide requirement as contemplated under Section 21 (I )(h) of the Act. The word "require" used in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Ac~ implies something more than a mere wish or impulse or desire on the part of the landlord. Although the element of need is present in both the cases, the real distinction between "desire" and "require" lies in the insistence of the need~ There is an element of "must have" in the case of "require" which is not present in the case of mere "desire". The ground mentioned in clause (h) of Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act emphasizes to the genuineness of the requirement of the landlord. The tenn, "reasonable and bonafide require­ ment" are complementaiy and supplementary to each other in the context. Dealing with a similar provision under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, this Court in Dattatraya Laxnian Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & Am:, [1999]. 4 SCC 1 held that when the F Legislature employed the two terms together the message to be gathered is that requirement must be really ·genuine from any reasonable standard. Where eviction is sought on the aforesaid grolind, a duty is cast upon the court to satisfy itself with the alleged requirement of the landlord. Even in a case where the ti;nant does not contest oi dispute the claim of the landlord and the tenancy G is governed by the Rent Control legislation, the cowt is obliged to look into the claim iridependently and give a specific finding in that .regard. ~ ··. Learned corinsel for the appellant tooku.s through the evidence prOduced in the case and· we have also perused the order of the Trial Cowt as well as the High Court, We find no ground to interfere with the findings arrived at H by the High C()urt vide the order impugned in these appeals. .I - f. SRI KEMPAIAH v. LINGAIAH [SETHI, J.] 649 Learned cowisel for the appellant also drew our attention to the orders · A passed by this Court in IA Nos.6 to 10 on 30th April, 2001 and prayed that as the respondents have failed to comply with the directions, eviction against them be directed in terms of Section 29( 4) of the Act. The submission has no substance in view of the Memo of Calculations filed by the appellant himself which shows that the respondents had made the payment of the rent as per their own calculations and even according to the appellant a meagre amowit is stated to have not been paid. Without determining the quantum of rent, particularly when the appellant himself was not sure about the monthly rate of rent, we are satisfied that the court order dated 30th April, 2001 stands substantially com- plied with not req'9cing the invoking of powers wider Section 29( 4) of the Act. There is no merit in these .appeals which are accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.