State of Haryana v. State of Punjab and Anr.

. The State of A.P. had prayed for 14 reliefs but, the Court observed, the reliefs essentially related to the construction of the Almatti D Dam on the river Krishna by the State of Karnataka to a height of 524.056 metres. Several issues were framed (at p. 627). Issue No. 2 related to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and try the suit under the provisions of Article 262 of the Constitution and Sections 11 and 2( c) of the Inter-State Water disputes Act, 1956. The issue was conceded by the E State of Maharashtra which had raised the issue. Over and above that, the Court was independently of the view (p. 640) that this Court had the jurisdiction to entertain and hear the suit and answered issue 2 in the affirmative. F Punjab's review petition was dismissed by us on the ground that the "so-called vital question with regard to the interpretation of Article 131 and Article 262 has been answered in the Constitution Bench decision and we are bound by the same." In the impugned judgment, we merely applied the interpretation of the Constitution Bench of the provisions of Article 131 and 262 to the facts of the case. There was no further interpretation of G Article 131 and 262 to be done in the case before us which required the decision of a bench of five Judges under Article 145(5). The objection as to the jurisdiction of this Court on the basis of Article 262 was specifically negatived in the judgment dated 15th January 2002 H when it was held : .. _, STATE v. STATE (RUMA PAL, J.] 885 " ........... the construction ofSYL Canal has absolutely no connection A with the sharing of water between the States and as such is not a "water dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(c) and consequently the question of referring such dispute to a Tribunal does not arise. In this view of the matter, howsoever wide meaning the expression "water dispute" in Section 2(c) of the Inter-State B Water Disputes Act be given, the construction of the canal which is the subject-matter of dispute in the present suit cannot be held to be a "water dispute" within the meaning of Section 2( c) of the Act and as such, such. a suit is not barred under Article 262 of the Constitution read with Section 11 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act". C Can the State of Punjab raise these issues again? Or is it barred by the principles of res judicata assuming that the principles of res judicata are 'law' within the meaning of Order 26 Rule 6(b)? The doctrine of res judicata and Order XXXII Rule 2 are not technical rules of procedure and are fundamental to the administration of justice in all Courts that there must be an end of litigation. Thus, when this Court was called upon in Dmyao v. State of UP., 7 to hold that res judicata could not apply in connection with proceedings before this Court under Article E 32 because of the extraordinary nature of the jurisdiction, it was said : "But is the rule ofres judicata merely a technical rule or is it based on high public policy? If the rule of res judicata itself embodies a principle of public policy which in turn is an essential part of F the rule of law then the objection that the rule cannot be invoked where fundamental rights are in question may lose much of its validity. Now, the rule ofres judicata as indicated ins. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no doubt some technical aspects, for instance the rule of constructive res judicata may be said to be technical; but the basis on which the said rule rests is founded on G considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in 7. 11962] I SCR 574, 582, 583 H the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. If these two principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata they cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Art. 32 ......... . The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an e~sential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis'."' This opinion was followed in the matter of Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal. [1993] 1 SCC 96 (II) and applied to suits under Article 131. The factual background of that case was a dispute over the usage of the waters of the river Cauvery between the States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. The D Union Government constituted the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal and referred the disputes between the two States to the Tribunal. The State of Tamil Nadu filed an application for interim relief. This was rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that it did not have the jurisdiction to grant any interim relief because that dispute had not been referred to it by the Central E Government. Being aggrieved, the State of Tamil Nadu approached this Court under Article 136. The Special Leave Petitions were converted into Civil Appeals and disposed of by Order dated 26th April, 1991 by holding that the order of Reference showed that the Central Government had in fact referred the issue relating to interim relief to the Tribunal. The Tribunal F then granted interim relief on Tamil Nadu's application. Kamataka subsequently issued an Ordinance relating to the utilization of water of the Cauvery and gave it overriding effect over any interim order of any Court or Tribunal. The Ordinance was replaced by an Act. In the meanwhile a suit was filed under Article 131 by the State of Karnataka against the State of Tamil Nadu contending that the Tribunal's order granting imterim relief G was without jurisdiction and, therefore, null and void etc. In the context of these developments, the President referred three questions to this Court for its opinion under Article 143 of the Constitution. Of the three questions, question No. 3 raised the issue whether a Water Disputes Tribunal H 8. ibid at p.584. STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.] 887 constituted under the Inter-state Water Disputes Act, 1956 was competent A to grant any ;nterim relief to the pa11ies in the dispute. This Court approached the question from two angles namely: (I) when no reference of grant of interim relief is made to the Tribunal and (2) when such reference is made it. The Court held that by its earlier decision of 26th April, 1991 it had been specifically held that the Central Government had made a reference to the Tribunal for consideration of the claim for interim relief prayed for by the State of Tamil Nadu. Implicit in the said decision was the finding that the Central Government could refer the matter of granting interim relief to the Tribunal for adjudication. Although the Court had in such C earlier decision kept open the question whether the Tribunal would have the power to grant interim relief when no reference was made, it was held that the earlier decision had in terms concluded the second aspect of the question. A submission was then made on behalf of the State of Karnataka that the earlier directions in the Court's order dated 26th April, I 99 I should D be declared as being without jurisdiction and void. This Court's decision in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, [1998] 2 SCC 602, was relied on to contend that this Court could rehear the issue earlier concluded. The decision was distinguished by this Court and it was held that the facts in A.R. Antulay are ·'peculiar and the decision has to be confined to those special facts". E It was then held. "It cannot be said that this Court had not noticed the relevant provisions of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act. The Court after perusing the relevant provisions of the Act which were undoubtedly F brought to its notice, has come to the conclusion that the Tribunal and jurisddion to grant interim relief when the question of ·granting interim relief formed part of the Reference. There is further no violation of any of the principles of natural justice or of any provision of the Constitution. The decision also does not transgress the limits of the jurisdiction of this Court. We are, G therefore, of the view that the decision being inter partes operates as res judicata on the said point and it cannot be reopened." Since the doctrine of res judicatu is an "essential part of the rule of Law" it follows that if the issues in the suit are barred by res judicata ex H A facie then this Court is required to reject the plaint in terms of Order XXIII Rule 6(b ). There is no substance in the submission of Punjab that even when there is no dispute of fact the issue of res judicata should be left for consideration at the trial of the suit. The decision cited viz. Surayya v. Balagangadhar, AIR ( 1948) PC 5 is an authority for the proposition that B the issue of res judicata must be specifically pleaded and is inapposite to the questions raised in this case. Here the earlier proceedings have been referred to in the plaint and are matters of record. As we have said both issues pertaining to the Court's jurisdiction under Article 145(3) and 262 have been considered and decided by this Court. The issues have been C concluded inter partes and cannot be raised again in proceedings inter part es. The same objection relates to the challenge to Section 78 of the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966. In paragraph 18 of the written statement filed by the State of Punjab in O.S. No. 6/96 there is an express challenge D to Section 78 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act for want of legislative competence. But there is an additional ground apart from res judicata for holding that the issue as to the constitutional validity of Section 78 cannot E be raised. The State of Punjab had earlier filed a suit, being O.S. No. 2 of 1979 in this Court challenging the validity of ;ection 78 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, l 976. In paragraphs 3 to 11 of the plaint, the constitutional validity of Section 78 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act, l 966 had been specifically challenged. The following prayer among other F prayers was made : "(a) Declaration that the provisions of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 in so far as they purport to authorise the Central Government to make determination with respect to the waters of the river Beas Project and allocation or distribution of such waters is ultra vires the competence of Parliament and violative of Article 24(3) of the Constitution. As far as OS No. 2179 is concerned it was unconditionally withdrawn in view of the agreement dated 13th December, 1981 as has been noted H earlier. . -.. .. " ,, STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.) 889 Rules I and 2 of Order XXXII of the Supreme Court Rules which A relate to the withdrawal and adjustment of suits provide : 1 . "Rules 1, 2 and 3 of Order XXXl I in the First Schedule to the Code with respect to the withdrawal and adjustment of suits shall apply in suits instituted before the Cou1t. B 2. No new suit shall be brought in respect of the same subject­ matter until the terms or conditions, if any, imposed by the order permitting the withdrawal of a previous suit or giving leave to bring a new suit have been complied with." C Rule 2 therefore allows a plaintiff to file a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter as the earlier withdrawn suit only if (i) the order of withdrawal imposed conditions and those D conditions have been complied with; or (ii) the order of withdrawal granted leave to the plaintiff to bring such fresh suit. In the order allowing OS 2 of 1979 to be withdrawn no such E conditions are present. Consequently a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter viz., the validity of section 78 of the 1966 Act does not lie. We leave open the question as to whether it is open to the State of Punjab to question the vires of the statute by which it was created. Similarly the challenge to Section 14 of the 1956 Act must be ejected at the threshold. The section reads : "Constitution of Ravi and Beas Waters Tribunal.- ( 1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions G of this Act, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a Tribunal under this Act, to be known as the Ravi and Beas Waters Tribunal for the verification and adjudication of the matters referred to in paragraphs 9.1 and. 9.2 respectively of the Punjab Settlement. H 890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. (2) When a Tribunal has been consituted under sub~section (1), the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 4, sub-section (2), (3) and (4) of Section 5 and Section SA to 13 (both inclusive) of this Act relating to the constitution, jurisdiction, powers, authority and bar of jurisdiction shall, so far as may be, but subject B to sub-section (3) hereof. apply to the constitution, jurisdiction, powers authority and bar of jurisdiction in relation to the Tribunal constituted under sub-section (I). (3) When a Tribunal has been constituted under sub-section (I), the Central Government alone may suo mo tu or at the request of the concerned State Government refer the matters specified in paragraphs 9.1. and 9.2 of the Punjab Settlement to such Tribunal. Explanation - For the purpose of this section "Punjab Settlement" D means the Memorandum of Settlement signed at "New Delhi on the 24th day of July, 1985." In paragraph 51 of Punjab's Written Statement in OS 6 of 1996, it was admitted that the issues referred to in paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 of the E Punjab settlement were referred to the Ravi-Beas Tribunal by Government notification dated 2nd April 1986 and the affirmation of the continued availability of water from the Ravi-Beas system as on 1.7.85 referred to in the notification was relied upon. The notification dated 2nd April 1986 was issued under Section 14 of the Inter-States Water Disputes Act. As far F as the report of the Tribunal is concerned, paragraph 8 of the written statement says that it could not be relied upon because it had not become final and that Punjab did not accept the correctness of "most of its findings". There was no dispute raised as to the constitutionality of Section 14 at any stage. Even in the course of arguments, when Section 14 was specifically referred to in elaborate written notes on the scope, purport and G effect of Section 14, it was submitted that the effect of Section 14 is four­ fold : (A) To overcome procedural hurdles that no dispute had been raised and to by pass the mandatory requirement of negotiations. ( .. . STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.] 891 (B) To deem matters referred under Section 14 to be a 'water A dispute' and place this beyond challenge. (C) To constitute this special section 14 Tribunal under this Act and not any other provision or statute and make the other provisions applicable. B (D) To oust the jurisdiction of all Courts including the Supreme Court by making Section 11 applicable to this dispute. (E) To leave all other disputes relating to the Punjab settlement c to be decided under the amended Act of 1958 . This Court in the judgment dated 15th Janury 2002 considered the arguments of the parties relating to Section 14 and negatived Punjabs' submission as to the construction of section 14. Punjab could have challenged the constitutional validity of Section 14 in its written statement. D It did not then. It cannot do so now being barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In this suit Punjab has claimed that the section is ultra vires because "(i) the raison-d'etre for the introduction of Section 14 in the Act, 1956 was the assumption of the validity of Punjab Settlement i.e. Memorandum of Settlement dated 24.07.1985, which is incorrect as the said Settlement is not a valid or F binding Agreement; (ii) The enactment of Section 14 is beyond the competence of Par! iament since on the face of it, it is agaii,st the constitutional Scheme as set out in the Constitution undei: Article 262 read with entry 56 of 7th Schedule, List I. G (iii) The special enactment has the effect of making a general legislation specific to Ravi-Beas Waters. This is discriminatory to the inhabitants of Punjab living in the Ravi-Beas Valley and is therefore, constitutionally invalid. H 892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 2 S.C.R. (iv) There can be no legislative enactment by Parliament in respect of an invalid Agreement... ......... . (v) In any event and without prejudice to t~e foregoing, no Agreement can be executed in part to the exclusion of other B obligations imposed thereunder, as each' obligation is an inter-connected and dependant bargain; (vi) Because in any event and without prejudice to the foregoing, the Punjab Settlement has become incapable of being performed under the changed circumstances as also for the reasons that the State of Haryana has resiled therefrom and is unwilling to abide by the letter and spirit of the said Settlement. From these reasons it also follows that Section 14 which is nothing but a statutory adjudication has no efficacy in law. (vii) In any event and without prejudice to the foregoing the purposes for which Section 14 was incorporated in the act. 1956 have become redundant in the light of the facts and circumstances set out above and as the said provision is no longer capable of meeti'lg the objectives for which it was purportedly enacted : The challenge to Section 14 of the 1956 Act has been made "'without prejudice to Punjab's pending application under Section 5(3) of the Act". F Assuming such a reservation is legally possible, the ground for submitting Section 14 of the 1950 Act is "unsustainable" is legally impermissible. It is well established that constitutional invalidity (presumably that is what Punjab means when it uses the word "unsustainable") of a statutory provision can be made either on the basis of legislative incompetence or because the statute is otherwise violative of the provisions of the Constitution. G Neither the reason for the particular enactment nor the fact that the reason for the legislation has become redundant, would justify the striking of the legislation or for holding that a statute or statutory provision is ultra vires. Yet these are the grounds pleaded in sub-paragraphs '(i), (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) to declare section 14 invalid. Furthermore merely saying that a H particula1 provision is legislatively incompetent [ground (ii)) or STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.] 893 discriminatory [ground (iii)] will not do. At least prima facie acceptable A grounds in support have to be pleaded to sustain the challenge. In the absence of any such pleading the challenge to the constitutional validity of a statutory provisions is liable to be rejected in limine. The grounds given in suppo1t of Punjab's challenge to Article 14 are B ex-facie no grounds in law and tio "cause of action" has been disclosed to challenge the constitutional validity of Section 14 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1986. Not only does the plaint filed by Punjab in OS I of 2003 not disclose any cause of action, but it is also evident from the statements in the plaint that the suit is barred by law. The plaint is accordingly rejected leaving open the other issues raised by Haryana in C support of its appliration. Additionally and in the ultimate analysis, it is manifest that the suit has been filed only with a view to subvert the decision of this Court with all the disingenuousness of a private litigant to resist its execution. We D have, in the circumstances, no compunction whatsoever in dismissing the suit under Order XL VII Rule 6 of the Rules. I.A. No. I of 2003 filed by the State of Haryana in O.S. I of 2003 is accordingly allowed. The plaint is rejected and Suit I of 2003 (State of E Putifab v. State of Haryana) is dismissed with costs. IA. No. 4 In O.S. 6 of 1996 Haryana has asked for enforcement of the decree dated 15th January, 2002 under Article 142 of the Constitution read with clause 2(b) of the F Supreme Court (Decrees and Orders) Enforcement Order 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the 1954 Order) praying that the Court may : (a) Issue directions to the Union of India (Defendant No. 2) to carry out its obligations under the decree and for the purpose : G (i) nominate Border Roads Organisation (BRO) as the construction agency charged with the task of completing and making functional the SYL canal as expeditiously as possible, and in any case within a period ofone year from the date of this Hon'ble Court's H 894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. order on this application; (ii) Nominate the Central Water Commission (CWC) as the agency to provide technical guidance and supervision to the construction agency; (iii) Appoint a High Court Powered Committee consisting of the Secretaries referred to in paragraph 16-H (iii) to monitor the function of the above agencies and to submit progress reports to this Hon 'ble Court on a monthly basis. C (b) In the event the Union fails to carry out the above directions within a period of four weeks, issue order nominating and appointing the agency for construction, the agency for providing technical guidance and the High Powered Committee and direct all of them to carry out their respective tasks as specified in prayer (a) above. (c) Press such other or further order or orders or such directions as this Hon 'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and to meet the ends of justice. E The basis of the application is the failure of the State of Punjab to either continue or complete the incomplete portion of the SYL canal in the Punjab territory within the period specified in the Decree and the subsequent failure of the Union of India to take any steps to complete the canal through its own agencies. The State of Punjab has filed a counter affidavit in which it has asked for deferring the application for execution on the ground that OS lof2003 has been filed, that a prayer in the suit had been made for discharge from the mandatory injunction and that a letter of complaint had been filed under Section 3 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956. Punjab has also G submitted that the application for execution was not maintainable, because Haryana had not applied for orders in terms of Clause 2(b) of the 1954 Order, that draft issues had been filed by Haryana and Punjab in Suit I of 2003 pursuant to an order passed by this Court dated 24.11.2003 in that suit, that water disputes were to be resolved on the basis of Punjab's H complaint under Section 3 of the 1956 Act, that the Decree sought to be <. STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.] 895 executed was liable to be modified under the changed circumstances, and A that the Decree was a nullity. On the merits it is denied that nothing was done by the State of Punjab to continue or com!Jlete the portion of the canal within its territory and that the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) did not have the reqttisite experience for constructing SYL canal and finally that the Haryana's prayer for appointment of a High Power Committee showed B that the Decree dated 15th January, 2002 is not executable in the ordinary course. The Union of India has also filed a counter affidavit in which it has stated that it has already taken steps to implement and comply with the C Decree within the "constitutional limitations''. It has referred to several meetings held and also the correspondence exchanged between the parties. It has however, submitted that the BRO was committed to canying out work in border areas and in Jammu and Kashmir in particular till the year 2016 and that it would not be possible to deploy BRO for the purpose of construction of the canal. It has said that it has asked for the engineering D details from the State of Punjab, who had executed the works and in whom the control of the works are vested at present. It has also submitted that the possession of the SYL canal works needs to be handed over by the State of Punjab to the agencies as may be selected by the Union of India and that Budget estimates would have to be made for completion of the canal. E According to the Union an action plan has been prepared in which provision has been made for setting up a High Powered Committee, but, it is submitted, there was no necessity for the High Power Committee to report back to this Court. As far as nomination of the Central Water Commission is concerned, it says that this might cripple the chances of F other more suitable agencies. It has finally been submitted that the State of Punjab should be directed to extend it fullest cooperation and protection for the completion of the work by the Union of India. The Union's affidavit although filed in answer to I.A No. I and 3 in O.S. No. 6 of 1996 was, at its instance, directed to be treated as its answer to I.A. No. 4 (vide this Court's order dated 17th December, 2003). G Punjab was required to complete the canal by 15th Januaiy, 2003 by the decree. Instead of accepting the decree in good grace, every possible step has been taken to thwart the decree. The minutes of the meetings and the correspondence exchanged between the parties during this period H A shows that the State of Punjab did not comply with this Court's directives on the ground that : ( 1) Punjab would await the final repo1t of the Ravi-Beas Water Tribunal; (2) the farmers of the State had tiled a review petition in this Court in which the Government was a party. The matter was subjudice and Punjab was not in a position to start the digging of the canal. (3) the Government of Punjab intended to file another revision petition before this Court. (4) that the construction ofSYL canal was likely to produce strong advise reaction among the people of Punjab and may also provide an emotive issue to secessionists/militant elements and D the construction ofSYL canal would lead to drying up of9 lakh hectares land in the Punjab; and (5) Suit No. I of 2003 had been filed. E Incidentally, the fourth ground is almost a verbatim reproduction of Punjab's stand in the proceedings filed by it earlier. There was no stay granted by this Court at any stage of any of the various proceedings filed assailing the decree. Even when the final assault was made by the filing of Suit No. I of 2003 we did not grant any stay and it is basic law that F the mere filing of proceedings does not operate as a stay. The correspondence and the record of minutes show that the Chief Minister as well as the Government officials named in the correspondence have arrogated themselves the power of sitting as a super-judicial body over this Court. The Constitution provides for an ordered polity within this country G to promote integrity of the country. When disputes arise between States there are usually political underpinnings. The resolution of such a dispute in favour of one party will invariably have a political impact. Article 131 of the Constitution has therefore given this Court the exclusive jurisdiction to decide such a dispute strictly on legal considerations a.1d in keeping with H the provisions of the Constitution. To resist the execution of the decree on f STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.] 897 the ground that it would have a political fall out would result in subversion A of the Constitution, an endorsement of anarchy and the disintegration of the country. Apa11 'from rendering the provisions of At1icle 131 a dead letter such a stand is contrary to Atticle 144 which requires all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. It is not in the circumstances expected, that Governments whether B at the Centre or in the States, will not comply with the decree of this Court. By refusing to comply with the decree of this Court under Article 131 not only is the offending party guilty of contempt but the very foundation of the Constitution which the people governing the State have sworn to uphold when assuming office and to which this country owes its continued existence, is shaken. It is, we repeat, the Constitutional duty of those who C wield power in the States to create the appropriate political climate to ensure a respect for the constitutional processes and not set such processes at naught only to gain political mileage. As was observed by the Constitution Bench, in Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (supra) when an Ordinance was passed by a State seeking to nullify the order of this Court. D "Such an act is an invitation to lawlessness and anarchy, inasmuch as the Ordinance is a manifestation of a desire on the part of the State to be a judge in its own cause and to defy the decisions of the judicial authorities. The action forebodes evil consequences to E the federal structure under the Constitution and opens doors for each State to act in the way it desires disregarding not only the rights of the other States, the orders passed by instrumentalities constituted under an Act of Parliament but also the provisions of the Constitution. If the power ofa State to issue F such an Ordinance is upheld it will lead to the breakdown of the constitutional mechanism and affect the unity and integrity of the nation". These observations appositely reflect what can be said with regard to the conduct of the State of Punjab. In any event there is now no question G of deferring Haryana's application for execution because the suit itself, namely, O.S. No. I of 2003 has been dismissed. The vague plea relating to the possible rise of militancy by the construction of the canal is not an acceptable defence at all. The fact that a letter of complaint has been filed under Section 3 of the 1956 Act is immaterial as that pertains to a water H 898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. A dispute within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the 1956 Act and we have already held that the construction ofSYL canal is not a water dispute within the meaning of the 1956 Act read with Article 262 of the Constitution. We have already held that the decree cannot be said to be a nullity. In any event this is not a question which can be raised while opposing an application B for execution. What remains of Punjab's opposition is its submission that the application of Haryana is not maintainable under the 1954 order. The 1954 Order has been issued by the President in exercise of powers under Article 142( I) of the Constitution. Punjab's objection to the C maintainability of Haryana's application for execution because of alleged non-compliance with paragraph 2(d) of the 1954 Order is unsustainable. We quote paragraph 2 before giving our reasons in support of this conclusion : ''Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law in force D at the commencement of this Order, any decree passed or order made by the Supreme Court whether before or after such commencement, including any order as to the costs of, and incidental to, any proceedings in that Court shall be enforceable : (a) (b) where such decree or order was passed or made in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction - in accordance with the provisions of Jaw for the time being in force relating to the enforcement of decrees or orders of the Court or Tribunal from which the appeal to the Supreme Court was preferred or sought to be preferred; and in any other case. - in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force relating to the enforcement of decrees or orders of such Court, Tribunal or authority as the Supreme Court may specify in its decree or order or in a subsequent order made by it on the application of any party to the proceeding. The decree passed by this Court, under Article 131 being an original H proceeding would not be covered by clause 2(a). Clause 2(b) empowers < STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.] 899 this Court to specify the law according to which the decree may be A enforced. The phrase used is "in accordance with" and not ''under". "in accordance with" in the context similarity or harmony but not ide11tity. The mode of enforcement which may be specified under clause 2(b) may therefore be similar to the methods of execution legally provided in respect of decrees or orders of any Court, Tribunal or Authority. The specification B of the mode may be done in the decree itself or by a subsequent order made on an application of any pa11y to the proceeding. The decree in this case had not specified the mode of execution. Haryana's application is expressed to be under clause 2(b) of the 1954 Order. Doubtless Haryana has suggested the passing of directi9ns to ensure implementation of the decree C which may not be acceptable to,,us, but it has in prayer (c) prayed for "such other or further order or orders'' or such directions as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and to meet the of justice". That pfa'yer is sufficient to meet even the entirely technical objection of Punjab and it cannot be said that Haryana's D application is not maintainable."'As to the mode of execution section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "51. Power of Court to enforce execution. - Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, E on the application of the decree-holder, order execution of the decree - (a) by delivery of any prope11y specifically decreed; (b) by attachment and sale or by the sale without attachment of F any property; ( c) by arrest and detention in prison for such period not exceeding the period specified in section 58, where arrest and detention is permissible under that section; ( d) by appointing a receiver; or ( e) in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require." A The residuary power under Section 51 ( e) al lows a Court to pass orders for enforcing a decree in a manner which would give effect to it. The period specified in the decree for completion of the canal by Punjab is long since over. The Union of India has said that it had worked out a contingent action plan during this period. The contingency. in the form of expiry of th: one B year period in January 2003 has occurred. We have not been told whether the contingency plan has been put into operation. Although it appears that the Cabinet Committee on Project Appraisals had approved the proposal for completion of the SYL canal by the BRO and at a meeting convened as early as on 20th February 1991. the then Prime Minister directed that the BRO take over the work for completion of the SYL Canal in the minimum time possible, the BRO is not now available for the purpose. After the decree the Central Water Commission Officials have inspected the canal on 9th October 2002. The report has assessed a minimum period of about two years for removing silt deposits, clearing of trees and bushes, completing the damaged and balance works and making the canal functional D and has estimated an amount of about Rs. 250 crore for this purpose excluding the liabilities of Punjab. In the circumstances we direct the Union of India to carry out its proposed action plan within the following time frame: E (I) The Union of India is to mobilize a Central agency to take control of the canal works from Punjab within a month from today. (2) Punjab must hand over the works to the Central Agency within 2 (Two) weeks thereafter. (3) An empowered committee should be set up to coordinate and facilitate the early Implementation of the decree within 4 (four) weeks from today. Representatives of the States of Haryana and Punjab should be included in such Committee: ( 4) The construction of the remaining portion of the canal including the survey; preparation of detailed estimates and other preparatory works such as repair, desilting, clearance of vegetation etc. are to be executed and completed by the Central Agency within such time as the High Powered STATE v. STATE [RUMA PAL, J.] 901 Committee will determine. (5) The Central and the Punjab Government should provide adequate security for the staff of the Central Agency. We conclude this chapter with a reminder to the State of Punjab that B ''Great states have a temper superior to that of private litigants, and it is to be hoped that enough has been decided for patriotism, the fraternity of the Union, and mutual consideration to bring it to an end'" Application 4 of2003 in OS 6of1996 is thus allowed on th~ atoresaid C terms without any order as to costs. S.K.S. Application allowed. 9. Commonwealth of Virginia v. State of West Virginia, 55 L.ed 353.