Life Insurance Corporation of India v. R. Dhandapani
Cited by 3 judgments in this corpus
- MAVJI C LAKUM v. CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA · 2008 INSC 442
- U.B. GADHE AND ORS. ETC. ETC v. G.M. GUJARAT AMBUJA CEMENT PVT. LTD. · 2007 INSC 991
- M/S. L&T KOMATSU LID. v. N. UDAYAKUMAR · 2007 INSC 1217
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. The Life Insurance Corporation of India (in short
the 'LIC') calis in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division
bench of the Madras High Court, in a writ appeal filed under Clause 15 of the
Letters Patent holding that even if the penalty of removal from service is held
to be in order, the respondent-employee nevertheless would be entitled to
H pension to which he would be entitled "but for his removal".
LIFE INSURANCECORPORA TION OF INDIA v. R. DHANDAPANI [PASAYA T,J.] 491
Background fact~ in a nutshell are as under: A
Respondent was employed as an Assistant in the LIC in the year, 1962.
He worked in the Coimbatore Branch of the LIC from 1967 onwards. Prior to
that he had worked at Erode for a period of 2 years i.e. from 1965 to 1967.
On 14.12.1983 he was transferred to Attur and therefore relieved from the
Coimbatore Branch. However, the respondent did not join duty at Attur and B
sought for privileged leave. Thereafter he claimed leave on medical grounds.
He did not appear before the doctor designated by the LIC to substantiate
his claim of leave on medical grounds. Thereafter he continued to remain
absent till the time the charge sheet was issued to him on 16.8.1984. As the
period of absence from duty was about 233 days, LIC asked the respondent C
to appear before the doctor designated by it pursuant to the powers under
applicable Regulation 30(8) of LIC which inter alia provided that in the case
of sickness or accident an employee shall not absent himself without submitting
"a medical certificate satisfactory to the competent authority". He failed to do
so .. After the charge sheet setting out his misconduct of dis?bedience to
lawful order, insubordination and unauthorized absence from duty was issued, D
he submitted a reply but did not take part in the enquiry by asserting that
no enquiry was needed. The enquiry officer after completing the enquiry
found the charges levelled against the employee had been proved. The
disciplinary authority after taking note of that report held that in view of
charge of insubordination and disobedience which were charges of serious E
nature and which had been proved, it was not in the interest of the appellant ,
- LIC to continue him in service and directed his removal from service.
Respondent raised an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (in short the 'Act') before the Industrial Tribunal, Madras. In the counter
affidavit to the claim made by the respondent, the past conduct of the
respondent-employee was highlighted and it was pointed out that he had F
been issued charge sheets earlier in a span of 6 years on seven occasions.
It was also pointed out that he had been penalised pursuant to the charge
sheets on more than one occasion. The Industrial Tribunal after examining the
claim and the counter and the records of enquiry concluded that the enquiry
had been properly held, the respondent was stubborn and adamant and there
was not Justifiable reason for not reporting for duty to Attur. Tribunal held G
that even in spite of all the lapses highlighted, punishment of removal from
service was harsh. Instead of imposing of any specific punishment, directions
were given that the workman was to be deprived of three fourth of the back
wages from 17.12.1983 (the date when he was relieved on transfer) till 15.4.1987
(date of reference) and order for reinstatement in service with full back wages H
492 SUPREME €0URT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A from 16.4.1987 and.all other benefits including continuity of service.
A writ petition was filed by LIC before the High Court. A learned Single
Judge dismissed it. Thereafter th~ Letters Patent Appeal was filed. Stand of
LIC before the Division Bench was that in vfow of the provisions of Section
11-A of the Act it was not open for the Industrial Tribunal, however wide the
B provision may be construed, to substitute its view solely on the ground that
it felt that the penalty was excessive without demonstrating as to how the
penalty which had been imposed was grossly disproportionate. Reliance was
placed on the decision of this Court in CMC Hospital Employees' Union v.
CMC Ve/lore Association, [1987] 4 SCC 691.
c The High Court held that on the facts of the case, t,he conduct of the
respondent disclosed gross disobedience andAhe proved misconduct was
one of deliberate disobedience to the <;>r:ders~ft'hl; superiors compounded by
adamant .attitude in remaining absenlt9f' a period of 233 days. He did not even
' appear before the doctor '"'.hich the ~inployer had required him to do. The
I) Appeal was therefore allowed and the Award of the Tribunal directing
reinstatement with back wages was set aside. After doing so, the High Court
granted some reliefs which form the subject matter of challenge in this Appeal.
The reliefs granted are contained in Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the impugned
order which read as follows :
"20: The employee had put in twenty two years of service before
he was removed. We do not think that it is just to deprive of the
benefit of those twenty two years of service and permit the employer
to withhold from him the pt:nsion which he was, but for his reitl~val,
qualified to receive on the basis of his service. In the circum§funies,
we feel it appropriate and just to direct the employer to grant him the
pension for the period of service that he had put in before his reiii:~val.
The employer shall make the necessary computation and sl(all disburse
the amount due to him as early as possible._
...... ~"
21. During the pendency of the matter in this Court, the employee had
been paid his last drawn wages under Section 17 B of the l.D. Act.
The respondent shall not be liable to refund all or any of the sums
so received by him."
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that ~e High Court was
not justified in granting the relief as noted above after having found the
H conduct of the respondent to be obnoxious and holding that his acts amounted
LIFE INSURANCECORPORA TION OF INDIA v. R. DHANDAPANI [PASAYA T,J .] · 493
to gross insubordination. It was pointed out after coming into force of Life A
Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 (in short the
'Pension Rules') as notified by the Central Government, the employees who
retired after 1986 were alone eligible for pension. Under the said Rules, for the
employees who had retired prior to 1.1.1986 and were living as on 1.11.1997
a scheme was framed for grant of ex-gratia relief. Such ex-gratia amount was
to be paid from 1.11.1997 at a specified monthly rate with dearness relief etc. B
The said scheme for ex-gratia relief specifically provided that the same was
not applicable to those who were removed, dismissed or terminated from
service of the Corporation and those who had resigned from the Corporation
or to those who are on daily wage employment of the Corporation. Therefore
the High Court could not have granted relief of proportionate pension since C
the question of payment of pension to the respondent would not arise as he
was removed from service on 25.3.1985.
In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that certain
calculations were filed by the appellant before the High Court indicating as
to what would be the amount of pension payable and the same was filed D
during the course of hearing of a review application. It was, therefore, submitted
that there was implied acceptance of the direction and the question whether
the Pension Rules will apply or not, did not arise.
Learned counsel for the appellant by way of reply submitted that the
calculations on which reliance is placed by the respondent was to show to E
the High Court, the quantum of pension that would have been payable if the
High Court's directions were to be implemented and it did not come in the
way of appellant challenging that part of the order, in regard to which it had
a grievance.
It is not necessary to go into in detail regarding the power exercisable F
under Section 11-A of the Act. The power under said Section 11-A has to
be exercised judiciously and the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as
the case may be, is expected to interfere with the decision of a management
under Section 11-A of the Act only when it is satisfied that punishment
imposed by the management is wholly and shockingly disproportionate to the G
degree of guilt of the workman concerned. To support its conclusion the
• t
Indu~trtal Tri~i:mal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, has to give
reasons in support of its decision. The power has to be exercised judiciously
and mere use of the words 'disproportionate' or 'grossly disproportionate' by
itself will not be sufficient.
A In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well-
meant but wholly unsustainable, tendency towards a denudation of the
legitimacy of judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the Courts
must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and
should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the Courts
tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private
B benevolence. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and
the legitimacy of the conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal
findings and the judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable
on those findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and inisplaced
compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually
C lead to mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of
its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability. [See: Kera/a Solvent
Extractions Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan and Anr., (1994) 1 SCALE 631].
Though under Section 11-A, the Tribunal has the power to reduce the
quantum of punishment it has to be done within the parameters of law.
D Possession of power is itself not sufficient; it has to be exercised in accordance
with law.
The High Court found that the Industrial Tribunal had not indicated any
reason to justify variations of the penalty imposed. Though learned counsel
for the respondent tried to justify the Award of the Tribunal and submitted
E that the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have considered the case in
its proper perspective, we do not find any substance in the plea. Industrial
Tribunals and Labour Courts are not forums whose task is to dole out private
benevolence to workmen found by Labour Court/Tribunal to be guilty of
misconduct. The Tribunal and the High Court, in this ciise, have found a
F pattern of defiance and proved misconduct on not one but on several
occasions. The compassion which was shown by the Tribunal and
unfortunately endorsed by learned single Judge was fully misplaced.
In the aforesaid background the Division Bench of the High Coutt was .
wholly unjustified in giving directions contained in paragraph 20 of its order,
G having set aside the award of the Tribunal as affirmed by learned Single
Judge. The High Court has not even indicated as to under' what provision of
law and/or statutory enactment or Regulation or Scheme, pension was payable
to the respondent. On the contrary, the Pension Rules and the Scheme
referred to above clearly justified the stand of the appellant that the respondent
H was not entitled to receive any pension or benefit under the scheme.
LIFEINSURANCECORPORATIONOFINDIA 11. R. DHANDAPANI (PASAYAT,J.) 495
However direction given in Para 21 relating to payment under Section A
17-B of the Act needs no interference.
The appeal is accordingly allowed in part and we set aside the directions
contained in para 20 of the order of the Division Bench of the High Court.
Costs made easy.
B.S. Appeal allowed.