State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kedar Yadav
ARIJIT PASAYA T, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a
learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. By the impugned
judgment learned Single Judge while upholding the conviction of the
respondent for an offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') reduced the sentence to the period already
F undergone which was about I year and three months. The trial court had
found the respondent guilty and had imposed sentence of ten years rigorous
imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/- with default stipulation.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
The respondent allegedly assaulted the complainant- Parvat Singh by
an axe causing several grievous injuries. Complainant Parvat Singh (PW 10)
lodged a report at the police station to the effect that while he was doing
night duty at Dr. Ajay Lal Christian Hospital, the accused hit him on his head
by the sharp edge of an axe and other parts of the body. Other persons were
H present there, who witnessed the incident. They carried the complainant to
.... STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. KEDAR YADAV [PASAYAT, J.] 855
the hospital for treatment. Information was lodged at the Police Station and A
investigation was undertaken. The informant was treated at the hospital for
multiple injuries sustained by him. After completion of investigation, charge
sheet was filed and the matter was taken up for trial. Accused took the plea
of false implication. According to the medical report and the statement of the
doctor, there was a cut wound on the upper part of partial bone which was
straight cut and there was a parallel straight cut below said injury and there B
was a cross cut wound on the left acromiyo caviculas w_ound and the doctor
had advised to get x-ray of head, chest and left shoulder. Accord-ing to
statement of witnesses and doctors and medical report on the day of incident
there were injuries on the body of complainant caused by sharp edged
weapon. Therefore, there was no dispute as to presence of injuries on the C
body of the complainant.
Placing reliance on the evidence of the victim and others, the trial court
found· the accused guilty and convicted him and imposed sentence as afore
noted. The trial court took note of the evidence of the Doctor who had first
examined the informant. The trial court noted that in the opinion of the D
doctor all the injuries were caused by sharp axe or another sharp-edged
weapon and was enough to cause death of the victim. The doctor had advised
to get X-ray of head, chest and left shoulder of the victim. Several fractures
were also noticed. Taking note of the serious nature of the injuries inflicted
and the weapon used, the trial court held the accused-respondent guilty and E
imposed sentence as afore-noted.
Respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court. Learned counsel
appearing before the High Court for the accused-respondent did not question
the finding of conviction. The only prayer related to sentence. The High
Court without any discussion merely observed that the accused had undergone F
sentence of about one year and 3112 months, at the commission of offence was
aged about 20 years and an uneducated labourer coming from rural area.
Accordingly, the period of sentence of imprisonment was reduced to the
period already undergone.
Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the sentence G
imposed by the High Court is very much on the lenient side. In a case of this
nature no leniency should have been shown.
A bare perusal of the doctor's evidence shows that the accused in a
merciless and cruel manner attacked the victim on his head and shoulder
A causing grievous injuries. Therefore, the reduction of sentence was uncalled
for.
Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that
though confession appears to have been made before the High Court about
conviction that was really not called for. In any event, the occurrence took
B place nearly two decades back. Even if prosecution version is accepted in its
totality, the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC is not made out and
at the most it is one under Section 324 IPC. Referring to a judgment of this
Court in Kundan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1982] 3 SCC 213 it is submitted
that the High Court has rightly reduced the period of sentence.
c Though it is not necessary to examine whether Section 307 IPC had
any application, in view of the stand of the respondent that in reality that
Section 307 IPC had no application, we have considered that plea.
Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm
D ~to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of
law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is,
therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to
the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed
etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal
etc. v. State of Tamil Naidu, AIR (1991) SC 1463.
After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each
case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence,
the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime
has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really
relevant circumstances in a· dispassionate manner by the Court. Such act of
F balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in Dennis
Counc/e MCGDautha v. State of Callifornia: 402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711
that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a
reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in the
infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime, In
G the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for
reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the
consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of
each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably ..
distinguished.
- STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. KEDAR YADAV [PASAYAT, .I.] 857
The object should be to protect the society and to deter the criminal A
in achieving the avowed object of law by imposing appropriate sentence. It
is expected that the Courts would operate the sentencing system so as to
impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the
sentencing process has to be stern where it should be.
Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order B
in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the
crime, e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping,
misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral
turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social order, and
public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. C
Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic
view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be
result-wise counter productive in the long run and against societal interest
which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt
in ~he sentencing system.
The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not
awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual
victim but also against the society to which the criminal and victim belong.
The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it
should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with
which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting E
public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice
against the criminal".
It is to be noted that the alleged offence was of very serious nature.
Section 307 relates to attempt to murder. It reads as follows:
"Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and
under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he
would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, G
the offender shall be liable either to (imprisonment for life), or to
such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned."
To justify a conviction under this Section, it is not essential that bodily .
injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the
nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in H
A coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may
also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be
ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The Section makes
a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act
may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned,
B but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this
Section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of
the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the
death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act,
irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under
circumstances mentioned in the Section. An attempt in order to be criminal
C need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in Jaw, if there is present an
intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is
present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not
essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted.
D The Section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its res-ult,
if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was
done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances menti~ned in
the Section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be
acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the
E nature of a simple hurt.
This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Bairam Bama
Patil and Ors., [1983] 2 SCC 28, Girija Shanker v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
[2004] 3 SCC 793 and R. Parkash v. State of Karnataka, JT (2004) 2 SC
348.
In Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR (1965) SC 843 it was observed
in para 6 that mere fact that the injury actually inflicted by the accused did
not cut any vital organ of the victim, is not by itself sufficient to take the act
out of the purview of Section 307.
G Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be
caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case.
The circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or
minor will not by itself rule out application of Section 307 IPC. The
determinative question is intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and not
nature of the injury.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. KEDAR YADAV [PASAYAT, J.] 859
Section 307 deals with two situations so far as the sentence is concerned. A
Firstly, whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under
such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty
of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and secondly
if hurt is caused to any person by such act the offender shall be liable either
to imprisonment for life or to such punishment as indicated in the first part B
i.e. 10 years.
The nature of the injuries sustained, the weapon used and the opinion
of the doctors as noted above to the effect that the injuries were enough to
cause death, the trial court had rightly convicted the accused-respondent for C
offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. The decision In Kundan Singh 's
Case (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. The decision
was rendered in the background of the factual position as noticed in the
judgment.
Considering the principles indicated above, the inevitable conclusion is D
that the High Court was not justified in reducing the sentence to the period
already undergone. Taking into account all relevant aspects including long
passage of time which per se is not a ground for reduction in sentence, order
of the High Court, so far as it relates to the reduction of period of sentence,
is set aside. The respondent shall undergo custodial sentence for three years
subject to such remissions as may be available in law. Additionally, he shall E
pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-. Deposit of the amount shall be made within three
months from today. If the amount is not deposited the default sentence will
be one year rigorous imprisonment. In case the amount is deposited, a sum
of Rs.8,000/- shall be paid to the victim-Parvat Singh.
Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. F
N.J. Appeal Partly allowed.