Tarlok Singh v. State of Punjab

KRISHNA IYER, J. In Cr!. Appeal No. 337 /1976 by special leave Shri A. K. Sen has confined his challenge-indeed, leave itself was limited-to the question of sentence. The case of murder was proved and the conviction by the Sessions Court was confirmed by the High Court. The Sessions Judge awarded life imprisonment to two accused and death sentence to the appellant. The High Court confirmed the . death sentence and hence this appeal. Section 235 Cr. P.C. 1974 makes a departure from the previous Code on account of humanist considerations to personalise the sen­ tence to be awarded. The object of the provision is to give a fresh such circnmstances as may help the court in awarding an appropriate sentence having regard to the personal, social and other circumstances of the case. Of course, when it is a case of conviction under s. 302, I.P.C. if the minimum sentence is imposed the question of providing an opportunity under Sec. 235 would not arise. In this case it is admitted that no opportunity was given under s. 235(2) Cr. P. C. to the appellant to show cause as to why the lesser sentence of life imprisonment should not be inflicted. We may make it absolutely clear that such a failure will not affect the conviction under any circumstances. The only point is relevant to sentence. Even there in a murder case where the charge of murder is made out, the limited question is as between the two sentences prescribed under the Penal Code. In Santa Siligh v. State of Puniab(') this Court considering s. 235 (2) Cr. P. C. held that the hearing contemplated by that sub-section is not confined merely to hearing oral submissions but extends to giving an opportunity to the prosecution and the accused to place be­ fore the court facts and materials relating to the various factors bearing on the question of sentence and, if they are contested by either side, then to produce evidence for the purpose of establishing the same. Of course, in that particular case this Court sent the case back to the sessions court for complying withs. 235(2) Cr. P. C. It may well be that in many cases sending the case back to the Sessions Court may lead to more expense, delay and prejudice to the cause of justice. Jn such cases it may be ,more appropriate for the appellai~ court to give an opportunity to the parties in terms elf s. 235(2) to produce th-e ----·----(I) A.1.R. 1976 S.C. 2386 ~. • ,. TARLOK SINGH v. PUNJAB (Krishna Iyer, J.) 713 materials they wish to adduce instead of going through the exercise of sending the case back to the trial court. This may, m many cases, save time and help produce prompt justice. ln the present case we propose to adopt that course and counsel for the parties agree that they will rely upon the materials available on record and they have nothing more to offer to the court bearing on the question of sentence. It will be an idle formality in a situation like :that to remit the case to reconsider the question of sentence to the Sessions Court. Coming, to the facts of the present case, having heard both sides we are impressed by Shri Seu's submission that the death sentence has been inflicted nearly two years ago and the a-gony of such a sentence has been an excruciating experience suffered by the convict for a C long period. This, by itself, may not be a circumstance to bring down the death sentence, if otherwise the act is too brutal, depraved or meriting the highest penalty. It has been now established in many decisions of this Court that death sentence must be awarded where there are aggravating factors (vide E. Annamma v. State of Andhra Pra­ desh('). The appellant had two other assailants with him who have been awarded life imprisonment. Moreover, it is evident from the ~ D records that there was an exchange of abuse between the parties, viz., Shiv Singh and the accused party. It is also apparent that there was no motive for the appellant to kill the innocent child who died, a cir­ cumstance which has influenced the courts below in awarding the capital sentence. The other circumstances present also indicate that there is no particular reason why the appellant should have been given the severer sentence and we are satisfied that the ends of justice would E be met be awarding life imprisonment. We accordingly direct that the sentence of life imprisonment should be substituted in place of death sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court. We allow the appeal to this extent. Cr!. Appeal No. 367 of 1976 is dismissed as not pressed. S.R. (l) A.LR. 1974 S.C. 799 Cr. A. 337 allowed in part and sentence modified. Cr. A. 367 /76 dismissed.